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ABSTRACT 
For efficiency reasons, the software system designers’ 
will is to use an integrated set of methods and tools to 
describe specifications and designs, and also to perform 
analyses such as dependability, schedulability and 
performance. AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language) has proved to be efficient for software 
architecture modeling. In addition, AADL was designed 
to accommodate several types of analyses. This paper 
presents an iterative dependency-driven approach for 
dependability modeling using AADL. It is illustrated on a 
small example. This approach is part of a complete 
framework that allows the generation of dependability 
analysis and evaluation models from AADL models to 
support the analysis of software and system architectures, 
in critical application domains.  
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1. Introduction 
The increasing complexity of software systems raises 
major concerns in various critical application domains, in 
particular with respect to the validation and analysis of 
performance, timing and dependability requirements. 
Model-driven engineering approaches based on 
architecture description languages (ADLs) aim at 
mastering this complexity at the design level. Over the 
last decade, considerable research has been devoted to 
ADLs leading to a large number of proposals [1]. In 
particular, AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language) [2] has received an increasing interest from the 
safety-critical industry (i.e., Honeywell, Rockwell Collins, 
Lockheed Martin, the European Space Agency, Airbus) 
during the last years. It has been standardized under the 
auspices of the International Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE), to support the design and analysis of 
complex real-time safety-critical applications. AADL 
provides a standardized textual and graphical notation, for 
describing architectures with functional interfaces, and for 
performing various analyses to determine the behavior 
and performance of the system being modeled. AADL has 
been designed to be extensible to accommodate analyses 
that the core language does not support, such as 
dependability and performance.  
In critical application domains, one of the challenges 
faced by the software engineers concerns: 1) the 
description of the software architecture and its dynamic 
behavior taking into account the impact of errors and 
failures, and 2) the evaluation of quantitative measures of 
relevant dependability properties such as reliability, 
availability and safety, allowing them to assess the impact 
of errors and failures on the service. For pragmatic 
reasons, the designers using an AADL-based engineering 
approach are interested in using an integrated set of 
methods and tools to describe specifications and designs, 
and to perform dependability evaluations. The AADL 
Error Model Annex [3] has been defined to complement 
the description capabilities of the AADL core language 
standard by providing features with precise semantics to 
be used for describing dependability-related 
characteristics in AADL models (faults, failure modes and 
repair assumptions, error propagations, etc.). AADL and 
the AADL Error Model Annex are supported by the Open 
Source AADL Tool Environment (OSATE)1.  
At the current stage, there is a lack of methodologies and 
guidelines to help the developers, using an AADL based 
engineering approach, to use the notations defined in the 
standard for describing complex dependability models 
reflecting real-life systems with multiple dependencies 
between components. The objective of this paper is to 
propose a structured method for AADL dependability 
model construction. The AADL model is built and 
validated iteratively, taking into account progressively the 
dependencies between the components. 
The approach proposed in this paper is complementary to 
other research studies focused on the extension of the 
AADL language capabilities to support formal 
verifications and analyses (see e.g. [4]). Also, it is 
intended to be complementary to other studies focused on 
the integration of formal verification, dependability and 
performance related activities in the general context of 
                                                           
1 http://lwww.aadl.info/OpenSourceAADLToolEnvironment.html 
 model driven engineering approaches based on ADLs and 
on UML (see e.g., [5-9]). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the AADL concepts that are necessary 
for understanding our modeling approach. Section 3 gives 
an overview of our framework for system dependability 
modeling and evaluation using AADL. Section 4 presents 
the iterative approach for building the AADL 
dependability model. Section 5 illustrates some of the 
concepts of our approach on a small example and  
section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. AADL concepts 
The AADL core language allows analyzing the impact of 
different architecture choices (such as scheduling policy 
or redundancy scheme) on a system’s properties [10]. An 
architecture specification in AADL is an hierarchical 
collection of interacting components (software and 
compute platform) combined in subsystems. Each AADL 
component is modeled at two levels: in the component 
type and in one or more component implementations 
corresponding to different implementation structures of 
the component in terms of subcomponents and 
connections. The AADL core language is designed to 
describe static architectures with operational modes for 
their components. However, it can be extended to 
associate additional information to the architecture. 
AADL error models are an extension intended to support 
(qualitative and quantitative) analyses of dependability 
attributes. The AADL Error Model Annex defines a sub-
language to declare reusable error models within an error 
model annex library. The AADL architecture model 
serves as a skeleton for error model instances. Error 
model instances can be associated with components of the 
system and with the system itself. 
The component error models describe the behavior of 
the components with which they are associated, in the 
presence of internal faults and recovery events, as well as 
in the presence of external propagations from the 
component’s environment. Error models have two levels 
of description: the error model type and the error model 
implementation. The error model type declares a set of 
error states, error events (internal to the 
component) and error propagations2 (events that 
propagate, from one component to other components, 
through the connections and bindings between 
components of the architecture model). Propagations have 
associated directions (in or out or in out). Error 
model implementations declare transitions between 
states, triggered by events and propagations declared in 
the error model type. Both the type and the 
implementation can declare Occurrence properties that 
                                                           
2 Error states can also model error free states, error events can also 
model repair events and error propagations can model all kinds of 
notifications. 
specify the arrival rate or the occurrence probability of 
events and propagations. An out propagation occurs 
according to a specified Occurrence property when it 
is named in a transition and the current state is the origin 
of the transition. If the source state and the destination 
state of a transition triggered by an out propagation are 
the same, the propagation is sent out of the component but 
does not influence the state of the sender component. An 
in propagation occurs as a consequence of an out 
propagation from another component. Figure 1 shows an 
error model example.  
Error Model Type [simple] 
 
error model simple 
features 
Error_Free: initial error state; 
Failed: error state; 
Fail: error event  
 {Occurrence => Poisson λ}; 
Recover: error event 
 {Occurrence => Poisson µ}; 
KO: in out error propagation  
 {Occurrence => fixed p}; 
end simple; 
Error Model Implementation [simple.general] 
 
error model implementation   
 simple.general 
transitions 
Error_Free-[Fail] -> Failed; 
Error_Free-[in KO] -> Failed; 
Failed-[Recover] -> Error_Free; 
Failed-[out KO] -> Failed; 
end simple.general; 
Figure 1. Simple error model 
Error model instances can be customized to fit a particular 
component through the definition of Guard properties 
that control and filter propagations by means of Boolean 
expressions. 
The system error model is defined as a composition of a 
set of concurrent finite stochastic automata corresponding 
to components. In the same way as the entire architecture, 
the system error model is described hierarchically. The 
state of a system that contains subcomponents can be 
specified as a function of its subcomponents’ states (i.e., 
the system has a derived error model). 
3. Overview of the modeling framework 
For complex systems, the main difficulty for building a 
dependability model arises from dependencies between 
the system components. Dependencies can be of several 
types, identified in [11]: functional, structural or related to 
the recovery and maintenance strategies. Exchange of data 
or transfer of intermediate results from one component to 
another is an example of functional dependency. The fact 
that a thread runs on a processor induces a structural 
dependency between the thread and the processor. Sharing 
a recovery or maintenance facility between several 
components leads to a recovery or maintenance 
dependency. Functional and structural dependencies can 
be grouped into an architecture-based dependency class, 
 as they are triggered by physical or logical connections 
between the dependent components at architectural level. 
Instead, recovery and maintenance dependencies are not 
always visible at architectural level. 
A structured approach is necessary to model dependencies 
in a systematic way, to promote model reusability, to 
avoid errors in the resulting model of the system and to 
facilitate its validation. In our approach, the AADL 
dependability-oriented model is built in a progressive and 
iterative way. More concretely, in a first iteration, we 
propose to build the model of the system’s components, 
representing their behavior in the presence of their own 
faults and recovery events only. The components are thus 
modeled as if they were isolated from their environment. 
In the following iterations, dependencies between basic 
error models are introduced progressively.  
This approach is part of a complete framework that allows 
the generation of dependability analysis and evaluation 
models from AADL models. An overview of this 
framework is presented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Modeling framework 
The first step is devoted to the modeling of the application 
architecture in AADL (in terms of components and 
operational modes of these components). The AADL 
architecture model may be available if it has been already 
built for other purposes. 
The second step concerns the specification of the 
application behavior in the presence of faults through 
AADL error models associated with components of the 
architecture model. The error model of the application is a 
composition of the set of component error models.  
The architecture model and the error model of the 
application form the dependability-oriented AADL model, 
referred to as the AADL dependability model.  
The third step aims at building an analytical dependability 
evaluation model, from the AADL dependability model, 
based on model transformation rules.  
The fourth step is devoted to the dependability evaluation 
model processing that aims at evaluating quantitative 
measures characterizing dependability attributes. This step 
is entirely based on existing processing tools.  
The iterative approach can be applied to the second step 
of the modeling framework only or to the second and third 
steps together. In the latter case, semantic validation based 
on the analytical model, after each iteration, is helpful to 
identify specification errors in the AADL dependability 
model.  
Due to space limitations, we focus only on the first and 
second steps in this paper. A transformation from AADL 
to generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) for 
dependability evaluation purposes is presented in [12].  
4. AADL dependability model construction 
To illustrate the proposed approach, the rest of this section 
presents successively guidelines for modeling an 
architecture-based dependency (structural or functional) 
and a recovery and maintenance dependency. More 
general practical aspects for building the AADL 
dependability model are given at the end of this section. 
Note that we illustrate the principles using the graphical 
notation for AADL composite components (system 
components). However, they apply to all types of 
components and connections. 
4.1. Architecture-based dependency 
The dependency is modeled in the error models associated 
with the dependent components, by specifying 
respectively outgoing and incoming propagations and 
their impact on the corresponding error model. An 
example is shown in Figure 3: Component 1 sends data to 
Component 2, thus we assume that, at the error model 
level, the behavior of Component 2 depends on that of 
Component 1.  
 
Figure 3. Architecture-based dependency  
Instances of the same error model, shown in Figure 1, are 
associated both with Component 1 and with Component 2. 
However, the AADL dependability model is asymmetric 
because of the unidirectional connection between 
Component 1 and Component 2. Thus, the out 
propagation KO declared in the error model instance 
associated with Component 2 is inactive (i.e., even if it 
occurs, it cannot propagate to Component 1). 
The out propagation KO from the error model instance 
of Component 1, together with its Occurrence property 
and the AADL transition triggered by it form the “sender” 
part of the dependency. It means that when Component 1 
fails, it sends a propagation through the unidirectional 
connection. The in propagation KO from the error model 
instance of Component2 together with the AADL 
transition triggered by it form the “receiver” part of the 
dependency. Thus, an incoming propagation KO causes 
the failure of the receiving component.  
In real applications, architecture-based dependencies 
usually require using more advanced propagation 
controlling and filtering through Guard properties. In 
 particular, Boolean expressions can be defined to specify 
the consequences of a set of propagations occurring in a 
set of sender components on a receiver component. 
4.2. Recovery and maintenance dependency 
Recovery and maintenance dependencies need to be 
described when recovery and maintenance facilities are 
shared between components or when the maintenance 
activity of some components has to be carried out 
according to a given order or a specified strategy (i.e., a 
thread can be restarted only if another thread is running). 
Components that are not dependent at architectural level 
may become dependent due to the recovery and 
maintenance strategy. Thus, the AADL dependability 
model might need some adjustments to support the 
description of dependencies related to the maintenance 
strategy. As error models interact only via propagations 
through architectural features (i.e., connections, bindings), 
the recovery and maintenance dependency between 
components’ error models must be supported by the 
architecture model. Thus, besides the architecture 
components, we may need to model (at architectural 
level) a component allowing to describe the recovery and 
maintenance strategy. Figure 4-a shows an example of 
AADL dependability model. In this architecture, 
Component 3 and Component 4 do not interact at the 
architecture level. However, if we assume that they share 
a recovery and maintenance facility, the recovery and 
maintenance strategy has to be taken into account in the 
error model of the application. Thus, it is necessary to 
represent the recovery and maintenance facility at the 
architectural level, as shown in Figure 4-b in order to 
model explicitly the dependency between Components 3 
and Component 4. 
Also, the error models of dependent components with 
regards to the recovery and maintenance strategy might 
need some adjustments. For example, to represent the fact 
that Component 3 can only restart if Component 4 is 
running, one needs to distinguish between a failed state of 
Component 3 and a failed state where Component 3 is 
allowed to restart. 
 
 
 
- a -  - b -  
Figure 4. Maintenance dependency 
4.3. Practical aspects 
The order for modeling dependencies does not impact the 
final AADL dependability model. However, it may 
impact the reusability of parts of the model. Thus, the 
order may be chosen according to the context of the 
targeted analysis. For example, if the analysis is meant to 
help the user to choose the best-adapted structure for a 
system whose functions are completely defined, it may be 
convenient to introduce first functional dependencies 
between components and then structural dependencies, as 
the model corresponding to functional dependencies is to 
be reused. Generally, recovery and maintenance 
dependencies are modeled at the end, as one important 
aim of the dependability evaluation is to find the best-
suited recovery and maintenance strategies for an 
application. Recovery and maintenance dependencies may 
have an impact on the system’s structure.  
Not all the details of the architecture model are necessary 
for the AADL dependability model. Only components that 
have associated error models and all connections and 
bindings between them are necessary. This allows a 
designer to evaluate dependability measures at different 
stages in the development cycle by moving from a lower 
fidelity AADL dependability model to a detailed one. In 
some cases, not all components having associated error 
models are part of the AADL dependability model. The 
AADL Error Model Annex offers two useful abstraction 
options for error models of components composed of 
subcomponents: 
− The first option is to declare an abstract error model 
for a system component. In this case, the 
corresponding component is seen as a black box (i.e., 
the detailed subcomponents’ error models are not part 
of the AADL dependability model). This option is 
useful to abstract away modeling details in case an 
architecture model with too detailed error models 
associated with components does exist for other 
purposes. Issues linked to the relationship between 
abstract and concrete error models have been 
mentioned in [13].  
− The second option is to define the state of a system 
component as a function of its subcomponents’ states. 
This option can be used to specify state classes for 
the overall application. These classes are useful in the 
evaluation of measures. If the user wishes to evaluate 
reliability or availability, it is necessary to specify the 
system states that are to be considered as failed states. 
If in addition, the user wishes to evaluate safety, it is 
necessary to specify the system states that are 
considered as catastrophic. 
5. Example 
In this section we illustrate our modeling approach on a 
small software architecture representing a process whose 
functional role is to compute a result. The computation is 
divided in three sub computations, each of them being 
 performed by a thread. The thread Compute2 uses the 
result obtained by the thread Compute1 and the thread 
Compute3 uses the result obtained by the thread 
Compute2 to compute the result expected from the 
process. The three threads are connected through data 
connections according to the pipe and filter architectural 
style [14]. Due to space limitations, we only take into 
account two dependencies: 
− An architecture-based dependency between the 
computing threads: a failure in one of the computing 
threads may cause the failure of the following thread 
(with a probability p). In some cases, cascading 
failures can occur. 
−  A recovery dependency: Compute3 can only recover 
if Compute1 and Compute2 are error free. We assume 
that Compute2 can recover if Compute1 is not error 
free. 
The AADL dependability model of this application is 
shown in Figure 5 using the AADL graphical notation. 
 
Figure 5. AADL dependability model 
The AADL dependability model of this application is 
built in three iterations. The computing threads’ behavior 
in the presence of their own fault and recovery events is 
represented in the first iteration. The propagation KO 
together with corresponding transitions are added in a 
second iteration to represent the architecture-based 
dependency. The thread Compute1 can have an impact on 
Compute2 and Compute2 can have an impact on 
Compute3. We remind that the opposite is not possible, as 
the connections between threads are unidirectional. The 
recovery dependency is modeled in the third iteration. It 
requires the existence of a Recovery thread in the 
architecture model (see light grey part of Figure 5). Its 
role is to send (through the out port to3) a 
RecoverAuthorize propagation to Compute3 if Compute1 
and Compute2 are error free. 
Figure 6-a shows the error model Comp.general 
associated with threads Compute1 and Compute2. Figure 
6-b shows the error model Comp3.general associated with 
the threads Compute3. The three iterations are 
highlighted. Each line tagged with a (+) sign is added to 
the error model corresponding to the previous iteration 
while each line tagged with a (-) sign is removed from it 
during the current iteration. The first and second iterations 
are the same for all three computing threads. In the third 
iteration, it is necessary to distinguish between a failed 
state and a failed state from which Compute3 is 
authorized to restart. This leads to removing a transition 
declared in the first iteration, and adding a state 
(CanRecover) and two transitions linking it to the state 
machine. 
Figure 7 shows the Guard_Out property applied to port 
to3 of the Recovery thread in the third iteration. This 
property specifies that a RecoverAuthorize propagation is 
sent to Compute3 through port to3 when OK propagations 
are received through ports in1 and in2 (meaning that 
Compute1 and Compute2 are error free). The Recovery 
thread has an associated error model that is not shown 
here. It declares in and out propagations used in the 
Guard_Out property. 
The main idea of this method is to verify and validate the 
model at each iteration. If a problem arises during 
iteration i, only the part of the current AADL 
dependability model corresponding to iteration i is 
questioned. Thus, the validation process is facilitated 
especially in the context of complex systems. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presented an iterative approach for system 
dependability modeling using AADL. This approach is 
meant to ease the task of analyzing dependability 
characteristics and evaluating dependability measures for 
the AADL users community. Our approach assists the 
user in the structured construction of the AADL 
dependability model (i.e., architecture model and 
dependability-related information). To support and trace 
model evolution, this approach proposes that the user 
builds the model iteratively. Components’ behaviors in 
the presence of faults are modeled in the first iteration as 
if they were isolated. Then, each iteration introduces a 
new dependency between system components. Error 
models representing the behavior of several types of 
system components and several types of dependencies 
may be placed in a library and then instantiated to 
minimize the modeling effort and maximize the 
reusability of models. 
The OSATE toolset is able to support our modeling 
approach. It also allows choosing component models and 
error models from libraries. For the sake of illustration, 
we used simple examples in this paper. We have already 
applied the iterative modeling approach to a system with 
multiple dependencies in [12] and we plan to validate it 
against other complex case studies. 
 
 
  
Error Model Type [Comp] 
 
error model Comp 
features 
-- iteration 1 
(+) Error_Free: initial error state; 
(+) Failed: error state; 
(+) Fail: error event  
(+) {Occurrence => Poisson λ}; 
(+) Recover: error event 
(+) {Occurrence => Poisson µ}; 
-- iteration 2 
(+) KO: in out error propagation  
(+) {Occurrence => fixed p}; 
-- iteration 3 
(+) OK: out error propagation   
(+) {Occurrence => fixed 1}; 
end Comp; 
 Error Model Type [Comp3] 
 
error model Comp3 
features 
-- iteration 1 
(+) Error_Free: initial error state; 
(+) Failed: error state; 
(+) Fail: error event  
(+) {Occurrence => Poisson λ}; 
(+) Recover: error event 
(+) {Occurrence => Poisson µ}; 
-- iteration 2 
(+) KO: in out error propagation  
(+) {Occurrence => fixed p}; 
-- iteration 3 
(+) CanRecover: error state; 
(+) OK: in error propagation; 
end Comp3; 
Error Model Implementation [Comp.general] 
 
error model implementation Comp.general 
transitions 
-- iteration 1 
(+) Error_Free-[Fail]->Failed; 
(+) Failed-[Recover]->Error_Free; 
-- iteration 2 
(+) Error_Free-[in KO]->Failed; 
(+) Failed-[out KO]->Failed; 
-- iteration 3 
(+) Error_Free-[out OK]->Error_Free; 
end Comp.general; 
 
 
 Error Model Implementation [Comp3.general] 
 
error model implementation Comp3.general 
transitions 
-- iteration 1 
(+) Error_Free-[Fail]->Failed; 
(+) Failed-[Recover]->Error_Free; 
-- iteration 2 
(+) Error_Free-[in KO]->Failed; 
(+) Failed-[out KO]->Failed; 
-- iteration 3 
(-) Failed-[Recover]->Error_Free; 
(+) Failed-[RecoverAuthorize]->CanRecover; 
(+) CanRecover-[Recover]->Error_Free; 
end Comp3.general; 
a: Error Model for Compute1 and Compute2   b: Error Model for Compute3 
Figure 6. Error model for Compute1 / Compute2 
 
Guard_Out [port Recovery.to3] 
 
-- iteration 3 
(+) Guard_Out => 
(+) RecoverAuthorize when    
(+) (from1[OK]and from2[OK]) 
(+) mask when others 
(+) applies to to3; 
Figure 7. Guard_Out property (port Recovery.to3) 
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